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In the Matter of Baby K: The Fourth Circuit
Stretches EMTAIA Even Further

In 1994, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position on
the applicability of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act of 1986 (EMTALA)' when it decided In re Baby "K"' Baby K, an
anencephalic infant, was born in the hospital in October 1992. 3
Anencephaly is a congenital malformation found in a very small number
of infants in which a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp are
missing." One of the missing components of the brain is the cerebrum,
which provides cognitive abilities and awareness and allows interaction
with our surroundings.' Baby K, therefore, lacked all of these abilities,
was permanently unconscious, and could not see, hear, or otherwise
interact with her environment.6 As a side effect of her anencephaly,
Baby K had severe breathing problems at birth. Doctors at the hospital
recommended that the infant be given only supportive care in the form
of nutrition, hydration, and warmth and that a "Do Not Resuscitate
Order" would be a possibility. The mother, Ms. H, refused these
suggestions and demanded mechanical respiration for the infant.' The
hospital attempted to transfer the infant to other, more specialized
hospitals, but none would accept her.9 These breathing problems
persisted and required Baby Ks readmittance to the hospital on several
occasions for further respirator treatment.10 On the second of these
subsequent readmittances, the hospital, joined by the father of Baby K,
Mr. K, (collectively "the Hospital") filed this suit for declaratory
judgment on whether it must continue to provide such treatment to

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1993).
16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
3. 16 F.3d at 592.
4. Id.
1.

2.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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infants like Baby K." The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia ruled that in light of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,12 Americans with Disabilities Act," Child Abuse Amendments

of 1984,14 EMTALA,'3 and Virginia Medical Malpractice Act, 18 the

Hospital was not entitled to a declaratory judgment ratifying the
discontinuance of such measures with Baby K. 17 The Hospital appealed, contending that the district court erred when it: 1) construed
EMTALA to require a particular treatment rather than imposing a
prohibition on disparate treatment; 2) ignored the standard of care
provided to anencephalic infants as shown by the evidence; 3) failed to
recognize that physicians under Virginia state law can refuse to
administer treatment the physicians believe to be ethically and
medically unwarranted; and 4) ignored relevant language by not
applying EMTALA only to patients who, although unstable, are
transferred by hospitals. 8 Finally, the Hospital had argued to the
district court that further treatment of the anencephalic Baby K was
"futile," and it should therefore not be required to continue to incur the
expense of treatment which does not help the patient. 9 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found these arguments without merit
and elected to follow the plain language of the statute.20 The Court
affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that EMTALA
required the hospital to continue stabilizing respiratory treatment on
Baby K when necessary.1
The legislative history of EMTALA demonstrates that it was originally
enacted by Congress in 1986 to combat the problem of emergency
medical treatment facilities "dumping" patients who could not afford the
services.22 However, the wording of the statute states that it applies

11. Id.
12. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
13. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, §§ 3(2), 302, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12182
(1994).
14. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, § 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5101
(1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1993).
16. Virginia Medical Malpractice Act, VA. CODE ANN., § 8.01-581.1 (Michie 1950).
17. In re Baby K"K,832 F. Supp. at 1026-30.
18. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 595.
19. In re Baby K", 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
20. In re Baby "K, 16 F.3d at 598.
21. Id.
22. Mary Jean Fell, Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment andActiveLabor Act
of 1986: ProvidingProtectionfrom Discriminationin Access to Emergency Medical Care, 43
CATH. U. L. REV. 607, 610 (1994). The record is replete with Congress' belief that it was
enacting EMTALA to help only those whose economic disadvantage might prevent them
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to "any individual." 3 With the selection of the "any individual"
language, Congress, maybe unwittingly, expanded the coverage of
EMTALA to a much larger group than just those who are economically
disadvantaged.2 4 The problem faced by the courts is whether to apply
the provisions of EMTALA according to Congress' original intentions,
which only protected against economic dumping, or to interpret
EMTALA as protecting all patients, regardless of situation, from
discrimination in treatment.25 The Fourth Circuit first addressed the
provisions of EMTALA in Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America.2" Baber
brought the action against the doctors and hospital for their failure to
provide his mentally ill sister with an appropriate medical screening and
subsequent failure to provide her with stabilizing treatment, both
required by EMTALA" The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, holding that although EMTALA did allow the
institution of civil suits against federally-funded hospitals, it did not give
rise to a private cause of action against treating physicians nor did it
define the appropriate levels of medical screening for malpractice
purposes.2" The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision, finding that EMTALA was not intended to insure proper
diagnosis of emergency situations, but only that screening and treatment
procedures be given in a nondiscriminatory fashion.29 The Fourth
Circuit recognized the true breadth of EMTALA with its decision in

from receiving proper treatment. The record reflects that EMTALA was to apply to all
patients "regardless of financial status" and that patients are entitled to a certain level of
care, "regardless of their ability to pay." S. Rep. No. 146, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1986)
and 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N at 42, 427, and 430.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396dd(a) (1993). Specifically, EMTALA provides that:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any

individual(whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the
emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for
examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for
an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the

hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available
to the emergency department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical

condition (within the meaning of subsection (eX1) of this section) exists.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. Fell, supra note 22, at 610.
25. Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor

Act: Denialof Emergency Medical CareBecause ofImproperEconomic Motives, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1121, 1122 (1992).
26. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 874.
28. Id. at 877, 878.
29. Id. at 880.
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Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital,Inc.3" Brooks brought an action
against the hospital under EMTALA based on his contention that delays
in diagnosis and stabilization of his conditions caused permanent injury
to his spinal column."' The Fourth Circuit held that EMTALA did not
protect against misdiagnosis or malpractice in cases like Brooks. 2
However, the court continued in dictum to state that obligations of
hospitals required by EMTALA were not just to the economically
disadvantaged, but to "'any individual' who is presented to an emergency
room for examination or treatment of a medical condition."33 Yet, even
before the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brooks, EMTALA had already
been interpreted to apply to "any individual" in other jurisdictions.34
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baby K, the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth
and District of Columbia Circuits had found that EMTALA, according to
the statute itself, applied to any individual.3 5 Other jurisdictions had
also previously held that EMTALA guarantees only proper screening and
stabilizing treatment and does not protect against misdiagnosis or
malpractice.3" Therefore, there was little dispute among the courts
which had addressed the issue that EMTALA applied to any individual,
regardless of socio-economic class, and the standards which the statute
demanded.3 7 Thus, the Fourth Circuit was burdened with deciding the
scope it would give to the definition of "any individual."
In Baby K, the Fourth Circuit, disregarding the contrary legislative
history," affirmed the decision of the district court and found that
EMTALA provided that hospitals covered under the act must provide the
appropriate level of stabilizing treatment to any individual, regardless
of the precipitating condition requiring such treatment.39 With its
decision in Baby K, the Fourth Circuit continued to follow its previous

30. 996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993).
31. Id. at 709.
32. Id. at 711.
33. Id. at 711 n.4.
34. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990);
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Brooker v.
Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991); and Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387 (10th
Cir. 1993).
35. See supra note 33.
36. See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 266; see also Gatewood 933 F.2d at 1037.

37. See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 266; Brooker, 947 F.2d at 412; and Delaney, 986 F.2d at
387. Each of these courts found, from the plain language of the statute, that EMTALA
must be applied to individuals. Also, in Cleland and Brooker,the courts determined that
EMTALA imposed a minimum standard of care that must be given to all patients based
on their emergency medical condition.
38. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
39. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 598.
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interpretations of EMTALA, which also relied upon the "plain meaning"
of the words of the statute.4 The court referenced and followed these
interpretations directly from its prior decisions, Baber v. Hospital Corp.
of America and Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital,Inc." The court
further justified its holding that EMTALA applied to any individual by
referencing the holdings of other circuits which had held the same.4'
Finally, in the conclusion to its opinion, the court bolstered its application of EMTALA, even to an anecephalic infant, by relying on Congress'
rejection of "a case-by-case approach to determining what emergency
medical treatment hospitals and physicians must provide and to whom
they must provide it."' The Fourth Circuit also set a new precedent
under EMTALA with Baby K by ruling that a symptom of an underlying
condition which is classified as an "emergency medical condition,"
requires stabilizing treatment, regardless of the standard of care
normally accorded to treatment of the underlying condition." In the
only portion of its opinion that appeared to address the issue of morality,
the court stated that "[iut is beyond the limits of our judicial function to
address the moral or ethical propriety of providing emergency stabilizing
medical treatment to anencephalic infants."45 Only Judge Sprouse, in
his dissent, addressed the morality of the continuing treatment of Baby
K imposed upon the hospital by the majority.46
The implications of Baby K are far-reaching and, if the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning is adpoted by other circuits, could change the way
courts ajudicate EMTALA cases. It is important to note that the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the Hospital's appeal of the
case.' Presumably, this can be attributed to the relative uniformity of
decisions in EMTALA related cases which have been decided by the

40. See Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992); and Brooks
v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 711 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993).
41. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 595-96. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 880; and Brooks, 996 at
711 n.4.
42. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 593. The court specifically cited the decisions of Cleland
v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266; Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare
Corp., 933 F.2d 1037; and Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412 to support its
holding.
43. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 598.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Id. at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Judge Sprouse stated: "Given this unique
medical condition, whatever treatment appropriate for her unspeakably tragic illness

should be regarded as a continuum, not as a series of discrete emergency medical
conditions to be considered in isolation. Humanitarian concerns dictate appropriate care."
Id.

47. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
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different circuits.4 8 This uniformity has culminated in the intractible
position of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baby K on the method courts
should use in determining the applicabilty of EMTALA to specific
cases.4 9 From the Fourth Circuit's opinion, it is clear that it has
interpretated the language of EMTALA to allow for no exceptions,
regardless of circumstances.5" The importance of this interpretation
may be seen in the court's extension of "individual" status under
EMTALA to an anencephalic infant, which, by defintion, is not a
sensient human being.5 ' Indeed, the court's recognition of anencephalic
infants as "individuals" within the meaning of EMTALA and granting
their guardians the ability to require stabilizing treatment, is, without52
doubt, the most controversial topic of the court's opinion in Baby K.
In an attempt to justify its result, the Fourth Circuit compares
anencephalic infants to "comatose patients, those with lung cancer, [and]
those with muscular dystrophy-all of whom may repeatedly seek
emergency stabilizing treatment for respiratory distress and also possess
an underlying medical condition that severely affects their quality of life
and ultimately may result in their death."" The latter two categories
of patients (those with lung cancer and muscular dystrophy) cannot
reasonably be grouped with nonsensient infants, no matter how much
these two afflictions may degrade the quality of life of those who have
them. People with lung cancer or muscular dystrophy have cognitive
skills and perception, in spite of their conditions. Indeed, this very
position was espoused by Judge Sprouse, Senior Circuit Judge on the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.54 Judge Sprouse advocated that Baby
K's underlying condition should be the focus of any EMTALA inquiry
and any treatment of her condition should be considered to be continuing
in nature, not discrete events that each required stablization." This
position is the correct one because inevitably, no matter how protracted
and good the treatment may be, an infant with anencephaly will die.56

48. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266; Brooker v. Desert
Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412; Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387; and Gatewood v. Washington
Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037.
49. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 598.
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text which describes the condition of
anencephaly and its impact on children born with the defect.
52. Elizabeth G. Patterson, Human Rights and Human Life: An Uneven Fit, 68 TUL.
L. REV. 1527, 1555 (1994).
53. In re Baby "K7, 16 F.3d at 598.
54. Id. at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Janna C. Merrick, Symposium: InternationalSymposium on CriticallyIll Newborns,
CriticallyILL Newborns and the Law, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 189, 205-06 (1995).
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Because of the final futility of recurrent and expensive treatment of
anencephalic infants, many authors and area specialists have condemned
the ruling of the Fourth Circuit in Baby K.17 Although the district
court addressed and discarded the Hospital's argument that further
treatment of Baby K should not be required of the hospital because of
the futility of such treatment, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baby K
completely neglected the issue of futility in treating conditions like
anencephaly.58 The Fourth Circuit refused to allow moral concerns to
play a part in carving out exceptions to EMTALA, and in doing so, held
that state laws allowing physicians to make life-and-death decisions
based on medical and ethical concerns were pre-empted by EMTALA.59
This finding of pre-emption in the area of ethical and moral decisionmaking limits will substantially affect the states' ability to regulate the
dispensing of medical care within their borders. Of course, the broad,
textual interpretation that the Fourth Circuit and the other circuits have
given to the provisions of EMTALA does manage to serve the original
legislative purpose of the measure, to prevent dumping, even if this goal
It would appear that if
is achieved through overinclusiveness.'
Congress wishes to have EMTALA redirected to only apply to the
economically disadvantaged, as was its original intent, it will be forced
to enter the area again with reinforcing legislation. The Fourth Circuit's
decision in Baby K firmly cements the federal court system's interpretation that EMTALA applies to all individuals, regardless of their
sensience, condition, or economic position.
KEVIN T. BROWN

57. Id. at 204-06; see also E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism,Exoticare, and Coerced
Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 883 (1995); and Mark A.
Bonanno, The Case of Baby K: Exploring the Concept of Medical Futility, 4 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 151 (1995).

58. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d at 598.
59. Id. at 597.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

